MOGADISHU: WDM SECURITY SITUATION ANALYSIS

CONFLICTING FORCES

On one side, confronting Farmajo’s forces, though not for same objectives and reasons, are:

1. Al-Shabab
2. Hawiye clan militia led by the opposition
3. Militia of anti-government businesses and interest groups.
4. Stray militia for robbery and looting

On the other side, Farmajo’s Forces are:

1. Military, police, secret services, recruited and hailing from Hawiye, Marehan and Digil&Mirifle clans.

Barring de-escalation of armed confrontations in Mogadishu, Farmajo is extremely vulnerable, based on increasing likelihood that many of current FGS forces will desert him along their sub-clan lines. So much for the Farmajo’s Somali National Army, SNA.

Last night Farmajo had realized that his main military forces, Gorgor and Haramcad, couldn’t be trusted, as the opposition used clan cards in their respective areas to fragment the forces along sub-clan lines. Then, last night Farmajo have been calling people like Abdi Qaybdid and others to reduce tension. But, the oppostion demanded Farmajo to withdraw his forces, which he did. So what is the solution now? Farmajo has to accept election process to proceed with assurance by third part (1). Security forces will be influenced by the opposition to remain calm till Farmajo promise is seen rolling in (2). If above two go well, all the rest of militias wouldn’t have chance to destroy the state (3).

Hawiye are now understood to be avoiding destruction of Mogadushu. But, if Farmajo refuses to compromise, then Hawiye are ready to fight on, even if the city could be destroyed. That is their position now.

Once Farmajo’s forces are defeated, it would be back to square one between Islamists and warlords in the same manner as now defunct Union of Islamic Courts and Warlords were then.

The presence of international community in Halane Campound in Mogadishu Airport could be reduced radically, and AMISOM mission in Somalia would change, and if the worst scenario plays out, could be pulled off altogether. Western embassies would relocate, reducing some heads of missions to the status of “Special Envoys” to Somalia.

There wouldn’t be any talk on holding elections as Federal institutions could begin to unravel. We could look back at FGS as an experiment that went badly.

Forces of proxy would intensify their operations in a war zone and power vacuum left by Farmajo Regime.